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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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also proved incapable of organising an active struggle against the German
invaders in Poland itself. Furthermore, by its incorrect policy 3 it not in-
frequently plays into the hands of the German invaders.
"However, the interests of Poland and the Soviet Union lie in the
establishment of solid friendly relations between our countriesa and in the
people of Poland and the Soviet Union uniting in the struggle against the
common external enemy, as is demanded by the common cause of all the
The Soviet's Statement contained a number of incorrect assertions.
It suggested that the " emigre " Polish Government was " isolated from
its people " and that it had proved itself C{ incapable of establishing
friendly relations with the Soviet Union," In opposition to this Govern-
ment, the " Union of Polish Patriots in the U.S.S.R." was presented by
the Kremlin as the embodiment of all the virtues which the Polish
Government was supposed to lack. Since the newspapers issued by this
* Union ' spoke of Russia as their c fatherland/ theys no doubt, stood in
the best possible relation to that country but were, on the other hand,
utterly isolated from Poland and the Polish people.
The Russians adopted a new line in this Statement^ camouflaging the
6 Molotov-Ribbentrop Line' under the title of the £ Curzon Line.**
According to the appraisal of the Kremlin3 the whole affair would thus
be more easily digested by the British and American public. Furthermore.,
the Statement also suggested that the " 1939 frontiers/' by which was
meant that same c Molotov-Ribbentrop Line/ " could be modified in
Poland's favour in the areas with the majority of Polish population."
Thus the Soviet Government itself testified that behind this c Curzon
Line ' were areas containing a majority of Poles, and instilled] doubts as to
the * plebiscite * which had been undertaken in those districts where,
according to its figures, over e nine-tenths ? of the inhabitants had sup-
posedly voted for the Soviets.
Another new idea in this Statement was that Poland should be com-
pensated for the loss of her eastern provinces at the cost of Germany by
the incorporation into Poland " of these ancient Polish lands previously
wrested from her by Germany,, and without whicfi it would be impossible
to unite the whole of the Polish people in its State,, which thereby will
receive the necessary outlet to the Baltic Sea."
The principle of compensation as forwarded by the Statement appeared
* Ivor Thomas., Great Britain and Poland^ Liverpool., October, 1944, p. 8 :
. . . the facts about the * Curzon Line.' Actually, Lord Curzon had practically
nothing to do with it. This point is not without importance, for great play has
been made of the fact that Lord Curzon was notoriously anti-Soviet, and it might
be supposed that any frontier he proposed could hardly be unduly favourable to the
Soviet Union. But he never proposed the * Curzon Line ' as a frontier. In an
effort to find out the truth about this * line ' I naturally had recourse in the first
instance to th£ of&cial biography of Curzon by Lord Ronaldshay, but in all the
three volumes of work there is no mention of the * line. * It is mentionedjin Curzon;
The Last Phase (p. 204) by M. Nicholson, and this is what he says : "... Curzon
himself had little to do with it" (i.e., with that * line.') (See Vol. I, p. 93).